We study orders of risk and model uncertainty aversion in the smooth ambiguity model proposed by Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) . We consider a quadratic approximation of their model and we show that both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have at most a second order e¤ect. Speci…cally, the order depends on the properties of the support of the decision maker's limit prior, which we fully characterize. We …nd that model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect unless the support is a singleton, that is, unless model uncertainty fades away in the limit. Special attention is given to the binomial state spaces often used in mathematical …nance.
Introduction
In this paper we study the order of convergence, as uncertainty becomes smaller and smaller, of risk and model uncertainty attitudes in a quadratic approximation of the smooth ambiguity model of Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji [6] .
We show that, under standard di¤erentiability assumptions, both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have at most a second order e¤ect. The order that they feature depends on the properties of the support of the decision maker's limit prior. In particular, both attitudes have a second order e¤ect when this support is not degenerate. For example, model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect unless this support is a singleton, that is, unless model uncertainty fades away in the limit.
We illustrate these …ndings with a binomial example. Consider a binary state space = f1; 1g and the random variable W (!) = !. The net fW t g t>0 de…ned by
is a small uncertainty as t # 0. 1 For every t > 0, if the decision maker knows the probability q t of state ! = 1 and has wealth w, then she evaluates a perturbation W t by its certainty equivalent u 1 (q t u (w + t) + (1 q t ) u (w t)) :
The …nancial support of the European Research Council (advanced grant, BRSCDP-TEA) and the Carlson School of Management at the University of Minnesota (Deans'Research Grant) is gratefully acknowledged. 1 The notion of small uncertainty will be made precise in De…nitions 22 and 38. Index t has no speci…c temporal meaning; the net fWtg t>0 should not be regarded as a process, but as a sequence of static settings (see Section 3).
Case 1 Suppose supp is neither a singleton nor f0; 1g. In this case both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fW t ; t g t>0 as t # 0 and the same relevance in the quadratic approximation. 2 Case 2 Suppose supp is a singleton in (0; 1). In this case risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] while model uncertainty attitudes have a negligible e¤ect. In this case a KMM decision maker is eventually indistinguishable from a subjective expected utility one.
Case 3 Suppose supp = f0; 1g. In this case only model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] , while risk attitudes have a negligible e¤ect.
Case 4 Suppose = 0 or = 1 . In this case both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have a negligible e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] .
Summing up, order e¤ects of risk and model uncertainty attitudes depend on the properties of the support of . Case 1 is the "normal"one that features a support not degenerate, that is, neither a singleton nor f0; 1g. In this case, both attitudes have the same asymptotic importance as t goes to zero. Cases 2-4 describe what happens under di¤erent cases of a degenerate . In particular, unless the limit prior concentrates on a single model p -so that model uncertainty eventually vanishes -the attitude toward model uncertainty is relevant in the second order approximation. This is a natural feature of the smooth ambiguity model that Theorem 49 will establish in full generality for the important binomial case.
The rest of the paper investigates in full detail and rigor the meaning of small risks and uncertainties, …rst in a subjective expected utility setup and then in a more general smooth ambiguity setting. Section 3 considers the notion of small risk in a subjective expected utility setting that suitably extends to a Savagean setting the orders of risk aversion studied by Segal and Spivak [11] in a lottery setup. Section 4 further extends the analysis to the smooth ambiguity model. In this case we deal with small uncertainties and we show when risk and model uncertainty attitudes have a second or higher order e¤ect. The properties of the support of will play a key role, along the lines discussed before.
Sections 5 and 6 study order e¤ects for time varying risk and time varying uncertainty, respectively. In the latter case priors t are allowed to depend on index t. This dependence substantially complicates matters and requires a sharper version of the Taylor approximation that we establish in Theorem 40, the main technical result of the paper. Under suitable assumptions, Theorem 40 shows that
where fh t g t>0 is a net of random variables. The previous approximation (1) is the special case of this approximation for the net fW t g t>0 . Section 8 illustrates the …ndings of the earlier sections in the important binomial setup. As already mentioned, in this setup Theorem 49 fully characterizes -through the properties of the support of -the cases when risk and model uncertainty attitudes have either a second order or a negligible e¤ect. In particular, risk and model uncertainty attitudes have a similar order when this support is not degenerate. In view of the importance in mathematical …nance of the binomial case, Theorem 49 can be viewed as the paper main result. Finally, Section 9 considers a special binomial case, related to Skiadas [12] . We show that, at least in a static setting comparable to ours, [12] '…ndings on the negligible e¤ect of model uncertainty attitudes depend on the singleton nature of the support of that [12] considers for its purposes. In a continuous time framework, Hansen and Sargent (2009) propose a continuous-time limit of the smooth model in which model uncertainty attitudes survive (see Gindrat and Lefoll, 2010 , for another approach to this issue).
We close with couple of methodological remarks on this paper. First, its focus is on the di¤eren-tiable case; for this reason, most of our analysis deals with second order and higher e¤ects. Second, the approach of the paper is analytical rather than behavioral, that is, we consider the properties of the functional forms. A natural follow-up of our analysis would carry out a more detailed investigation of …rst order e¤ects and of the behavioral underpinnings of our exercise.
Preliminaries 2.1 Mathematical setup
Throughout the paper we consider a …nite state space of cardinality n and a base probability measure P : 2 ! R de…ned for simplicity on the power set 2 (all our results actually hold in any algebra of subsets of ).
The collection of all functions f : ! R can be thus identi…ed with R n . Given an interval I R, we set L (I) = ff 2 R n : f (!) 2 I for almost all ! 2 g :
Throughout the paper k k denotes the Euclidean norm of R n . Recall that in R n all norms are equivalent; i.e., given any norm k k 0 there exist positive constants c 1 ; c 2 > 0 such that
We denote by E P (f ) and 2 P (f ) the expectation and variance of a function f : ! R, respectively.
Barycenters The set of all probability measures q : 2 ! [0; 1] is the simplex of R n , which we denote by . We endow with the Borel -algebra B ( ). Each Borel probability measure : B ( ) ! [0; 1] induces a measure q 2 given by
called the barycenter of (and also denoted by ). It follows that,
The barycenter q has a natural interpretation in terms of reduction of compound lotteries. In fact, if supp = fq 1 ; :::; q m g is …nite 3 and (q i ) = i for i = 1; :::; m, then (3) becomes q (!) = 1 q 1 (!) + ::: + m q m (!) ; 8! 2 :
Hence, can be seen as a lottery whose outcomes are all possible models q, which in turn can be seen as lotteries that determine the state.
Orders of convergence Orders of convergence as t # 0 (that is, t ! 0 + ) are cardinal to our analysis. Given two functions '; : (0; 1] ! R, (i) ' (t) = o ( (t)) if for all M > 0 there exist such that j' (t)j M j (t)j for t < ;
(iv) ' (t) (t) if lim t#0 ' (t) = (t) = 1, provided (t) 6 = 0 for t su¢ ciently close to 0.
It is important to recall that ' (t) = o ( (t)) and (t) = O (' (t)) are abuses for ' (t) 2 o ( (t)) and (t) 2 O (' (t)).
The following property plays a key role in the paper.
Lemma 2 Given any two functions '; : (0; 1] ! R, it holds ' = O ( ) if and only if
for any function : (0; 1] ! R.
In particular, ' (t) (t) if and only if, for any function :
Weak and quadratic convergence Some of our results will use the standard notion of weak convergence of Borel probability measures on B ( ). Speci…cally, a net f g of Borel probability measures : B ( ) ! [0; 1] weakly converges to some Borel probability measure , written
where C ( ) is the space of continuous functions ' : ! R. 7 Weak convergence implies the following moments'convergence.
Lemma 3 If
In the special case in which is binary, the simplex = f(q; 1 q) : q 2 [0; 1]g can be identi…ed with the unit interval [0; 1]. In this case, the converse of Lemma 3 is also true. 
In view of Lemmas 3 and 4, we give the following de…nition.
De…nition 5 A net f g of probability measures : ! [0; 1] quadratically converges to a probability :
Thus, quadratic convergence only requires convergence of the …rst two moments. It is straightforward to construct nets of probability measures that quadratically converge, but do not weakly converge. 4 In other words, lim t#0 ' (t) = (t) = 0, provided (t) 6 = 0 for t su¢ ciently close to 0. 5 In other words, lim sup t#0 j' (t) = (t)j < 1, provided (t) 6 = 0 for t su¢ ciently close to 0. 6 Equivalently, there exist ; c 1 ; c 2 > 0 such that c 1 j (t)j j' (t)j c 2 j (t)j for t < . In other words, 0 < lim inf t#0 j' (t) = (t)j lim sup t#0 j' (t) = (t)j < 1, provided (t) 6 = 0 for t su¢ ciently close to 0. 7 For details on weak convergence we refer the reader to Aliprantis and Border (2006) . Notice that since is a compact metric space, weak convergence coincides with weak* convergence when probability measures on are regarded as continuous linear functionals on C ( ).
Decision theoretic setup
Given any nonsingleton interval I R of monetary outcomes, we consider decision makers who behave according to the smooth ambiguity model. Their preferences % over monetary acts are represented by the preference functional V : L (I) ! R de…ned by
where is a Borel probability measure on , and u : I ! R and : u (I) ! R are strictly increasing and continuous functions. We adopt the same setting of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Ru¢ no [7] . In particular, since we consider monetary acts, it is natural to study monetary certainty equivalents. To this end, set v = u : I ! R (see [6, p. 1859] ). In [7] we discuss to what extent v describes attitudes toward model uncertainty. Using v we can rewrite (7) as
The certainty equivalent function C :
This is the composition of two monetary certainty equivalents,
Consider the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cients u (w) = u 00 (w) =u 0 (w) and v (w) = v 00 (w) =v 0 (w). By [6, Prop. 1], the decision maker is ambiguity averse (as de…ned in [6, p. 1863] ) if and only if is concave, that is, if and only if v u . Ambiguity neutrality corresponds to (x) = x, that is, u = v (up to a normalization). In this case,
where q is the barycenter of given in (3) . Under ambiguity neutrality we thus get back to the certainty equivalent of a subjective expected utility decision maker with prior q. The same happens when the support of is a singleton fqg, that is, when the decision maker does not perceive any ambiguity. In this case it trivially holds q = q and again
In the ambiguity neutral and risk neutral case u (x) = v (x) = x, the certainty equivalent (9) reduces to the expected value E q (f ) of f under q. For this reason, the uncertainty premium (f ) of act f for the decision maker described by (9) is given by
Throughout the paper we maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 1
The functions u; v : I ! R are continuous, strictly increasing, and concave.
Under this assumption the certainty equivalent (9) is well de…ned and (f ) 0 for each f 2 L (I).
First remarks on attitudes
In view of the quadratic approximation (13) of the uncertainty premium (w + h) we can make a few preliminary remarks on risk and model uncertainty attitudes. Speci…cally, according to the properties of the support of we consider four basic cases:
The support of is neither a singleton nor a collection of Dirac measures. In this case both risk and model uncertainty attitudes typically matter.
Case 2:
The support of is a singleton; i.e., supp = fpg for some p 2 . In this case, q = p and only risk attitudes may matter. Speci…cally,
Case 3: The support of consists of Dirac measures, that is,
with ( 1 ; :::; n ) 2 . Simple computation delivers ( q 1 ; :::; q n ) = ( 1 ; :::; n ) and hence
In this case only model uncertainty attitudes may matter. In fact, we can write
Case 4: The support of is a singleton consisting of a Dirac measure; i.e., supp = f ! g. Neither risk nor model uncertainty attitudes matter in this case (which is the intersection of the two previous ones) and actually (w + h) = 0.
As argued in the Introduction, Case 1 is the normal one, while Cases 2-4 are special. They are all based on the properties of the support of , an information trait. In the asymptotic analysis that we will carry out in the paper the limit behavior of h will also matter, along with that of . This will give rise to the Limit Cases 1-4 of Sections 7 and 8.
3 Small risks
Notion and characterization
The notion of small risk is key to this paper. Since a de…nition of absolute risk smallness is elusive, we follow Pratt [10] in studying it via limit behavior. We …rst consider the case of a given probability measure q 2 . Our analysis will be based on nets fh t ; qg t2(0;1] where each h t : ! R is a monetary act. We call them risky monetary nets when lim sup t#0 E q (jh t j) < 1 and h t is never q-a.e null. This limit condition put some discipline on how outcomes h t (!) can diverge as t goes to zero.
In a coin toss example with = fH; T g, the net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] consists of acts whose outcomes h t (H) and h t (T ) depend on whether heads or tails come up, with probabilities q (H) and q (T ). As observed in the Introduction, index t has no temporal meaning. The net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] should not be regarded as a process, but as a sequence of static settings -"snapshots" -that at each t feature an act h t whose "riskiness" depends on q. 8 In this risk setting the certainty equivalent (9) reduces to
In terms of the smooth model, this can be due to either (x) = x (ambiguity neutrality) or a singleton support for (no perceived ambiguity). Either way, here we are in a standard subjective expected utility setting.
We can now present the key notion of small risk. The next result -a version for nets of a known result for sequences -characterizes small risks by considering three types of limit behavior and showing their equivalence to the notion of small risk. In particular, in (ii) limit behavior is in the sense of convergence in probability and acts'values eventually vanish with probability one according to q. In (iii) limit behavior is in the sense of L n (p) convergence and acts' moments eventually vanish. 9 Finally, in (iv) limit behavior is in the sense of almost sure convergence and acts' outcomes eventually vanish in each state that belongs to the support of q.
Proposition 12
For a risky monetary net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] , the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) fh t ; qg t2(0;1] is a small risk;
(ii) lim t#0 q (! : jh t (!)j < ") = 1 for each " > 0;
Condition (iv) easily implies (iii), which implies (i). In turn, (i) easily implies (ii). By the Chebyshev inequality, for all " > 0
Showing that (ii) implies (iv) is less immediate and is proved in the Appendix.
Order e¤ects
Small risks can be used to model small risky deviations h t from a sure prospect w and to study their e¤ects on the risk premium
Consider the following classi…cation: risk attitudes have a (i) …rst order e¤ ect at fh t ; qg t2(0;1] if (w + h t ) kh t k q ;
(ii) second order e¤ ect at fh t ; qg t2
This classi…cation revisits in our Savagean setup the orders of risk aversion that Segal and Spivak [11] studied in a lottery setting (see Montesano [9] for related ideas and Machina [8] for a comprehensive analysis). It is straightforward to see that (i)-(iii) are mutually exclusive alternatives, though not exhaustive.
The next result is related with [11, Proposition 1] and provides a behavioral characterization of these e¤ects. To this end, set
Proposition 13 Consider a small risk fh t ; qg t2(0;1] with E q (h t ) > 0 for all t.
(ii) If (w + h t ) k kh t k q and 0 < k < p k , then for all t small enough C (w + h t ) > w:
Points (i) and (ii) consider …rst order e¤ects, while point (iii) considers second or higher order e¤ects. Point (i) shows that when k is high enough (e.g., k 1), then (w + h t ) k kh t k q implies that for all t small enough the decision maker strictly prefers the sure amount w over the risky one w + h t . Since E q (h t ) > 0, a risk neutral decision maker would prefer the opposite. Hence, in this case even for small risks the decision maker is not risk neutral.
Points (ii) and (iii) show that this is no longer the case when either k is small enough or (w + h t ) = o kh t k q , that is, the e¤ect is of second or higher order. In these cases, for t small enough the decision maker compares w + h t and w as if he were risk neutral. That is, risk attitudes do not matter.
In sum, Proposition 13 shows that risk attitudes that have a …rst order e¤ects may or may not matter when comparing w + h t and w; with second or higher order e¤ects they do not matter.
Di¤erential case
Throughout this subsection we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2
The utility function u is twice continuously di¤ erentiable with u 0 > 0 and u (w) 6 = 0.
By Proposition 6, under this assumption a small risk fh t ; qg t2(0;1] has the quadratic approximation of its premium (w + h t ) given by
Remarkably, this approximation makes it possible to study risk attitudes'order e¤ects through the variance 2 q (h t ), an insight that goes back to Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1970 
Hence, risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fh t ; qg t2(0;1] when k < 1 and a negligible one when k = 1. In contrast, there are no clear cut e¤ects when k < k = 1.
This condition holds when fh t ; qg t2(0;1] is asymptotically constant, that is,
Intuitively, small risks that satisfy this condition are asymptotically riskless (notice that condition (20) trivially holds when supp q is a singleton). Under a regularity condition, the asymptotic condition (20) is also necessary for (19). (ii) Conversely, fh t ; qg t2(0;1] is asymptotically constant provided (19) and at least one of the following conditions hold:
In other words, risk attitudes are negligible when risk asymptotically vanishes, that is, for small risks that are asymptotically constant, and so asymptotically riskless. In this case,
Instead, when a small risk is not asymptotically constant (and we are not in the indeterminate case k < k = 1) we have
that is, when risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect, then the risk premium is asymptotically equivalent to 2
In this term, risk attitudes captured by u (w) are multiplicatively separated from the riskiness of the net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] captured by
Example 16 (i) Consider a small risk fh t ; qg t2(0;1] de…ned by (16); for example, a directional small
q and so risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect. If, instead, h is constant q-a.e., then k = E 2 q (h) =E q h 2 = 1 and so risk attitudes have a negligible e¤ect (it actually holds (w + h t ) = 0 for each 0 < t 1).
(ii) Consider a space = f1; 2g and a risky monetary net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] with 0 < q (1) < 1 and
This net is an asymptotically constant small risk (i.e., k = 1). Hence, (w + h t ) = o kh t k 2 q and risk attitudes have a negligible e¤ect at this small risk.
N Till now we studied order e¤ects at some small risk fh t ; qg t2(0;1] . It is a "directional"standpoint. A global one would require that the order be consistent across all small risks. For this reason, we say that risk attitudes have a
Clearly, if risk attitudes have a …rst, second, or negligible order e¤ect, the same applies to all small risks. Indeed, any small risk fh t ; qg t2(0;1] is such that kh t k q ! 0 as t # 0.
The next result shows that, unless q is trivial, there is always some small risk at which risk attitudes are not negligible.
Proposition 17 Risk attitudes have a negligible e¤ ect if and only if q is trivial, i.e., q = ! for some ! 2 .
Scales of risks
Some classic scales can be used to benchmark the rate at which E q h 2 t converges to zero (see, e.g., Hardy [5] ). The simplest is the power scale :::; t 1 n ; :::; t 1 2 ; t; t 2 ; :::; t n ; :::
Let us consider the case of quadratic speed t 2 (while similar considerations would apply to other powers).
De…nition 18 A risky monetary net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] is a quadratic small risk if
In other words, quadratic small risks feature second moments E q h 2 t that go to zero with at least quadratic speed. 
Next we characterize quadratic small risks.
Proposition 20 Given a monetary net fh t g t2(0;1] , the following conditions are equivalent:
Example 21 For the net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] de…ned by (16) we have E q (jh t j) = tE q (jhj). N Points (iv) of Propositions 12 and 20 show that the di¤erence between small risks and quadratic ones can be seen by looking at the limit behavior of h t (!) for each ! 2 supp q. Small risks correspond to their convergence to zero, i.e., h t (!) ! 0, while quadratic small risks require that this convergence occurs at least at linear speed, i.e., h t (!) = O (t).
Small uncertainties
The earlier risk analysis can be extended to account for ambiguity. We call uncertain monetary nets, indicated fh t ; g t2(0;1] , nets of monetary acts h t : ! R and probability distributions on , with lim sup t#0 E q (jh t j) < 1. In a coin toss example, is the decision maker's prior on the probability models q that determine how likely heads and tails are. Now the relevant certainty equivalent is (9) , that is,
Hence, an uncertain monetary net fh t ; g t2(0;1] induces a risky monetary net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] . Using these induced nets we can extend to uncertain monetary nets some of the notions that we previously established for risky ones.
De…nition 22 An uncertain monetary net fh t ; g t2(0;1] is a small uncertainty if and only if the induced risky monetary net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] is a small risk.
This fact is important to extend to small uncertainties the analysis carried out for small risks. A …rst consequence is that Proposition 12 holds verbatim with q in place of q. This means that, for example, fh t ; g t2(0;1] is a small uncertainty if and only if lim t#0 h t (!) = 0 for all ! 2 supp q.
Regarding order e¤ects, we now have uncertainty attitudes in place of just risk ones. In particular, uncertainty attitudes have a
Proposition 13 holds verbatim with q in place of q. Hence, the order e¤ects of uncertainty attitudes depend on the limit behavior of the ratio E q h
More can be said assuming di¤erentiability. Throughout the rest of the section we assume the following version of Assumption 1 (in which strict inequalities simplify the analysis).
Assumption 3
The functions u; v : I ! R are twice di¤ erentiable with
Under Assumption 3 we can consider the quadratic approximation
of the premium (w + h t ) of a small uncertainty fh t ; g t2(0;1] . This makes it possible to separate the e¤ects of risk and model uncertainty attitudes. In the present di¤erential setting …rst order e¤ects never arise with small uncertainties.
In view of this lemma, in the di¤erential case we only need to consider second and higher order e¤ects. In particular, risk attitudes have a (i) second order e¤ ect at fh t ; g t2(0
(ii) (quadratically) negligible e¤ ect at fh t ; g t2(0
A similar classi…cation holds for model uncertainty attitudes, with
If risk and model uncertainty attitudes both have a second order e¤ect, then overall uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect. If, instead, risk and model uncertainty attitudes have e¤ects of di¤erent orders, the overall uncertainty attitudes have e¤ects of the lower order. In particular, uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect either if risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect and model uncertainty attitudes have a higher order e¤ect or if the opposite is true. In this case we have
if both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have negligible e¤ects.
Example 24 Consider the net fh t ; g t2(0;1] such that the induced net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] is de…ned by (16). For example, a directional small uncertainty with h t = th, for a given a monetary act h. We have
Suppose that h is such that
, both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have second order e¤ects if
2 (E (h)) while only uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect if
We defer to Sections 7 and 8 a detailed analysis (for the binomial case) of the asymptotic versions of the four cases discussed in Section 2.4. Here we consider global e¤ects. In particular, in the di¤erential case risk attitudes have a
A similar classi…cation holds for model uncertainty attitudes, with 2 (E (h t )) in place of E 2 (h t ) . The following result extends Proposition 17 to uncertainty. In other words, risk attitudes are "globally" negligible if and only if the support of consists of Dirac measures on , while model uncertainty attitudes are globally negligible if and only if is itself a Dirac measure on (i.e., it gives full weight to a single model p 2 ). Finally, both attitudes are negligible when is a Dirac measure on a Dirac measure, that is, supp = f ! g. These cases are asymptotic global versions of Cases 2-4 discussed in Section 2.4.
Finally, we can de…ne quadratic small uncertainties when E q h
The analysis is similar, up to obvious modi…cations, to the one carried out for the risk case. For brevity we thus omit it.
Risk varying setting

Small risks
We extend our analysis to a risk varying setting in which q may depend on t. Thus, we now focus on nets fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] of monetary acts h t : ! R and probability distributions q t 2 that we call risky monetary nets provided h t is never q t -a.e null and q t ! q for some q 2 ; that is, lim t#0 q t (!) = q (!) for all ! 2 . These two conditions put some discipline on how outcomes and probabilities can vary as t goes to zero.
This notion of risky monetary nets fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] reduces to the earlier one when q t = q for all t 2 (0; 1]. Here, each act h t delivers outcomes under possibly di¤erent risk conditions determined by q t . We therefore relax the assumption that each static situation t features the same risk conditions. In a coin toss example, the probability q t (H) and q t (T ) with which heads and tails come up may depend on the index t. 10 The notion of small risk, introduced in De…nition 7, is readily extended to the present more general setting.
De…nition 26 A risky monetary net fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is a small risk if
There is a key novelty in this notion of small risk for the risk varying case: now there are two (complementary) sources of smallness, outcomes and probabilities. That is, we may have E qt h 2 t ! 0 because either outcomes h t (!) or their probabilities q t (!) (or both) are becoming smaller and smaller as t goes to zero. For example, consider = f1; 2g and
To characterize small risks we extend Proposition 12 to the risk varying setting. To this end, set
that is, S = lim sup t#0 (supp q t ). In words, ! 2 S if and only if for all t 2 (0; 1] there exists t such that q (!) > 0. It is easy to see that supp q lim sup t#0 (supp q t ). In addition, set q = S supp q; that is, q is de…ned as the di¤erence between the sets lim sup t#0 (supp q t ) and supp q. Clearly, q = ; when q t = q for all t 2 (0; 1]. In other words, the possible nonemptiness of q is peculiar to the risk varying setting. Indeed ! 2 q if and only if for all t 2 (0; 1] there exists t such that q (!) > 0 and 0 = q (!) = lim #0 q (!).
Lemma 27 It holds ! = 2 S if and only if q t (!) = 0 eventually.
1 0 The risk varying setting is more general than the previous one, even in terms of induced distributions on outcomes. For example, given = f1; 2g, let fht; qtg t2(0;1] be such that qt (1) 6 = q t 0 (1) for each t 6 = t 0 and ht (1) 6 = ht (2) for each t. Given any q 2 , it holds q (ht = x) 2 fq (1) ; 1 q (1)g for all t. Hence, there is no q 2 such that q (ht = x) = qt (ht = x) for all t. 1 1 The limit is meaningful since [
A direct implication of this lemma is q t (S) = 1 for each t small enough.
We now characterize small risks by generalizing Proposition 12, which is the special case q t = q for all t 2 (0; 1].
Proposition 28 For a risky monetary net fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] such that lim sup t#0 jh t (!)j < 1 for all ! 2 q , the following conditions are equivalent:
(ii) fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is a small risk;
(iii) lim t#0 E qt (jh t j n ) = 0 for some n 1;
Clearly, (i) implies (ii) and (ii) implies (iii). Moreover, (iii) is easily seen to imply (iv) since, by the Chebyshev inequality, for each " > 0,
as t # 0. The remaining implications are less straightforward and are proved in the Appendix.
Let us adapt Examples 8-10 to the present setting.
Example 29 (i) A net fh t g t2(0;1] that statewise converges as in (15) forms a small risk fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] along with any net fq t g t2(0;1] that converges to some q 2 .
(ii) In a risk varying setting, Pratt [10] 's analysis amounts to consider a risky monetary net fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] with E qt (h t ) = 0 and lim t#0 E qt h 2 t = 0.
(iii) As to Segal and Spivak [11] , let fq t g t2(0;1] be any net such that q t ! q. Fix a monetary act h 1 2 R n and de…ne a risky monetary net fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] such that, at each t 2 (0; 1], h t has the same distribution under q t as th 1 under q 1 . That is,
for all Borel subsets B of R.
, this net is a small risk. For example, given = f1; 2g let (h 1 ; q 1 ) be such that h 1 (1) = h 1 (2) = 1 and q 1 (1) = 1=3. Then, setting
If h t is such that h t (1) = h 1 (2) = t, then fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is a risky monetary net that satis…es (22).
(iv) In the spirit of the previous example are the directional small risks fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] , where h t = th, q t -a.e. and q t ! q, for a given monetary act h 2 R n . In fact, E qt h
Order e¤ects
To study the order e¤ects of small risks in the present risk varying setting we need to consider the indexed certainty equivalent
Relative to (14), the model q t may now change with t. In particular, the risk premium (17) now takes the form
If we de…ne
we can extend Proposition 13 to the present setting, up to obvious changes (i.e., we ought to add the index t whenever needed). Therefore, provided E qt (h t ) > 0 eventually, for all t small enough it holds
As in the constant risk case, risk attitudes with …rst order e¤ects may or may not matter when comparing w + h t and w; risk attitudes with second or higher order do not matter.
Substantially more delicate is the extension of the di¤erential case to this risk varying setting. Indeed, because of the dependence on t, we need to improve the quadratic approximation (18) to control for variations in t. To see why this is the case, consider a risky monetary net fh t ; qg t2(0;1] in which q t does not depend on t. In this case lim t#0 E q h 2 t = 0 and so the quadratic approximation of the uncertainty premium is given by (18), that is,
When q t depends on t, we need an approximation based on the time varying certainty equivalent C t (w + h t ) that at each t may feature a di¤erent model q t . This complication of the risk varying case has to be carefully addressed. To this end the next notion is key.
De…nition 30 A small risk fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is controllable if max !2supp qt jh t (!)j = O kh t k qt as t # 0.
The following proposition collects some useful features of controllable small risks. > 0.
If lim inf t#0
Eq t (h
> 0, then fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is controllable.
Example 32 (i) Let = f1; 2g and
with ' (t) (t). If 0 < q t < 1 (where q t = q t (1) for all t 2 (0; 1]), then
and so this risky monetary net is controllable. If, instead, (t) = o (' (t)), then
and so, in this case, fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is controllable if and only if q > 0.
(ii) Directional small risks are controllable. For example, …x h and consider a risk pattern fq t g t2(0;1] with q t ! q. Let fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] be such that h t = th, q t -a.e., for each t 2 (0; 1]. Then, eventually
and so fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is controllable when E q h 2 > 0, i.e., h 6 = 0 q-a.e. N
The next result, a special case of Theorem 40 below, shows that in the controllable case we can suitably extend the quadratic approximation (25) to risky monetary nets.
Theorem 33 Let fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] be a controllable small risk. If Assumption 2 holds with u three times continuously di¤ erentiable, then
for all w 2 R.
In other words, the risk premium takes the form
that is, as t # 0,
where kh t k 2 qt ! 0 because fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is a small risk. Approximation (25) is the special case of (27) where q t = q for all t.
Thanks to
(ii) risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] if and only if k < 1;
(iii) risk attitudes have a negligible e¤ect at fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] if and only if k = 1, that is,
We defer a detailed analysis of these cases to Sections 7 and 8, where we study the binomial case in the more general setting of varying uncertainty that we will introduce in the next section. Now we extend Proposition 15 to show that risk attitudes are negligible when risk asymptotically vanishes.
Proposition 34 Under Assumption 2 with u three times continuously di¤ erentiable, risk attitudes are negligible at controllable small risks fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] that are asymptotically constant, that is,
In words, risk eventually vanishes and risk attitudes do not matter.
Quadratic small risks
The notion of quadratic small risks, introduced in De…nition 18, readily extends to the present setting.
De…nition 35 A risky monetary net fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is a quadratic small risk if
Next we characterize quadratic small risks: relative to Proposition 20, here the case of n = 2 plays a special role.
Proposition 36 Given a risky monetary net fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is a quadratic small risk;
Given ! 2 q , su¢ cient conditions for h 2 t (!) q t (!) = O t 2 are q t (!) = O t 2 and lim sup t#0 jh t (!)j < 1. That is, (ii) holds -and so fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is a quadratic small risk -if h t (!) = O (t) for all ! 2 supp q and if q t (!) goes to zero fast enough, with jh t (!)j bounded for all ! 2 q .
The next example shows that, unlike Proposition 20, condition (ii) in Proposition 36 does not hold for any n.
Example 37 (i) Directional small risks are quadratic. For
(ii) Given = f1; 2g, let fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] be given by h t (1) = 1, h t (2) = t, and q t (1) = t 3 . Then, 27) , that is,
6 Uncertainty varying setting
In this section we extend our earlier risk analysis to account for ambiguity, as modeled by the smooth ambiguity model (7). We consider a net of probability measures f t g t2(0;1] on and we allow to depend on the index t. As in (3), we set
We call uncertain monetary nets, indicated fh t ; t g t2(0;1] , nets of monetary acts h t : ! R and probability distributions t on such that h t is never q t -a.e null and t sq =) for some on . In a coin toss example, t is the decision maker's prior on the probability models q that determine how likely heads and tails are. This prior now can vary with t.
. Hence, an uncertain monetary net fh t ; t g t2(0;1] induces a risky monetary net fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] such that q t ! q. Using these induced nets we can readily extend to uncertain monetary nets what we have previously established for risky ones. Let us begin with the notions of small uncertainties.
De…nition 38 An uncertain monetary net fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is a small uncertainty if and only if the induced risky monetary net fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is a small risk.
This de…nition extends the scope of De…nition 26 to uncertainty. In particular, an uncertain monetary net fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is a a small uncertainty if and only if lim t#0 E qt h 2 t = 0. For this reason, Proposition 28 holds with q t and q in place of q t and q, respectively.
To study the behavior of small uncertainties we consider the indexed certainty equivalent
Relative to the certainty equivalent (14), the prior t may now change with t. Through the induced small risk fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] we can easily extend to uncertainty all results on order e¤ects established in Section 5.2 by setting
For brevity, we omit the details. As in the risk varying case, the dependence on t requires a substantial improvement of the quadratic approximation (12) to control variations in t. In order to do so we …rst extend the notion of controllability to uncertainty.
De…nition 39 A small uncertainty fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is controllable if max !2supp qt jh t (!)j = O kh t k qt as t # 0.
That is, fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is controllable if and only if fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] is. In particular, Proposition 31 has a natural counterpart and directional small uncertainties are controllable provided h 6 = 0, q-a.e..
We can now generalize the quadratic approximation (12) . The dependence on t of the priors t substantially complicates the derivation of the following quadratic approximation, which we prove in Appendix B. It is the main technical contribution of the paper.
Theorem 40 Let fh t ; t g t2(0;1] be a controllable small uncertainty. If Assumption 3 holds with u and v three-times continuously di¤ erentiable, then
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Thus, the uncertainty premium takes the form
Approximation (21) is the special case of (31) where t = for all t. Approximation (31) allows to study separately the order e¤ects of risk and model uncertainty attitudes through the mean of variances E t 2 (h t ) and the variance of means
Lemma 23 is readily extended to the present setting, so that E t 2 (h t ) = o kh t k qt and 2 t (E (h t )) = o kh t k qt for each small uncertainty fh t ; t g t2(0;1] . As a result, in the di¤erential case we can have only second and higher order e¤ects. In particular, risk attitudes have a (i) second order e¤ ect at fh t ; t g t2(0
(ii) (quadratically) negligible e¤ ect at fh t ; t g t2(0
. The next two sections will illustrate these notions in the important binomial case. In particular, Theorem 49 will show that the order e¤ect of E t 2 (h t ) and (E (h t )) critically depends on the limit properties of both outcomes, h t , and beliefs, t . The latter dependence is especially interesting: in a nutshell, when the support of t is trivial, model uncertainty attitudes are negligible; when it is not trivial, model uncertainty persists as t goes to zero. As a matter of fact, both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect when the support is not trivial. 
A binomial illustration
Consider a binomial model = f1; 2g. Let f t g t2(0;1] be any net of priors that quadratically converges to some , and let W t : ! R be given by W t = tW with
In this section we consider directional small uncertainties fW t ; t g t2(0;1] .
Lemma 41 fW t ; t g t2(0;1] is a controllable and quadratic small uncertainty.
Given q 2 , to ease notation we set q = q (1). In particular, each t can be viewed as a Borel probability measure on
and
Hence, for all w the quadratic approximation (31) of the uncertainty premium t (w + W t ) takes the form
Our goal is to study the limit behavior of t (w + W t ) as t goes to zero, thereby determining the impact of risk and model uncertainty attitudes on the certainty equivalent C t (w + W t ). To this end, throughout this section we suppose that Assumption 3 holds with u and v three times continuously di¤erentiable and u (w) ; v (w) > 0.
In particular, risk attitudes have a …rst order, second order, negligible e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] if, respectively, ( q t # t ) t 2 t, ( q t # t ) t 2 t 2 , and ( q t # t ) t 2 = o t 2 . As usual, a similar classi…cation holds for model uncertainty attitudes, with # t q 2 t t 2 in place of ( q t # t ) t 2 .
By (32) it holds 0 q t # t ; # t q 2 t 1, and so both E t 2 (W t ) and
2 . This, in turn, implies that risk and model uncertainty attitudes never have a …rst order e¤ect. Moreover, lim t#0 ( q t # t ) = q # and lim t#0 # t q 2 t = # q 2 exist …nite since t quadratically converges to some . As a result, E t 2 (W t ) and 2 t (E (W t )) have a well-de…ned limit behavior. Summing up:
(ii)
Thus, risk and model uncertainty attitudes have either a second order or a negligible e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] . Depending on which e¤ect prevails, the following four possible cases have to be considered.
Limit Case 1 q 2 < # < q: Then (33) becomes
that is, both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] and the same relevance in the quadratic approximation.
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Limit Case 2 q 2 = # < q: Then (33) becomes
that is, risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] while model uncertainty attitudes have a negligible e¤ect. In this case a KMM decision maker is eventually indistinguishable from a subjective expected utility one.
Limit Case 3 q 2 < # = q: Then (33) becomes
that is, model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] , while risk attitudes have a negligible e¤ect.
Limit Case 4 q 2 = # = q: Then (33) becomes
that is, both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have a negligible e¤ect at fW t ; t g t2(0;1] .
These four fundamental cases are asymptotic versions of the four cases discussed in Section 2.4 and they show that, in any case,
Next we essentially restate Proposition 1 of the Introduction, which characterizes the four cases through the properties of the limit prior . The proof follows from the two simple observations mentioned in the Introduction. By now, the interpretation of these four cases in terms of the properties of the support of should be clear. For this reason we move directly to illustrate these cases with couple of examples.
Example 44 Let 0 a t < b t 1, for each t. Then, for each Borel subset B of [0; 1], set
where is the Lebesgue measure on [0; 1]. The support of t is supp t = [a t ; b t ] and it is easy to show that if a t ! a and b t ! b as t # 0, then
Moreover, notice that in this case,
3 and the approximation can be explicitly written as 
General binomial analysis
In this section we extend our analysis to a general h t : = f1; 2g ! R such that, for each t > 0,
where ' and are nonzero real-valued functions de…ned on (0; 1]. If ' (t) = (t) = t, then h t = W t .
Throughout this section we consider an uncertain monetary net fh t ; t g t2(0;1] such that t is quadratically convergent to and q t 2 (0; 1) for all t 2 (0; 1]. Next we show that such net is a controllable small uncertainty when 6 = p with p 2 f0; 1g.
Lemma 46 If 6 = p with p 2 f0; 1g, then fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is a small uncertainty if and only if lim t#0 ' (t) = lim t#0 (t) = 0. In this case, fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is always controllable.
Next we consider the degenerate case = 0 (a similar result holds when = 1 ).
Lemma 47 If = 0 and lim t#0 (t) = 0, then fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is a controllable small uncertainty if and only if ' (t) = O ( (t)).
It is convenient to de…ne : (0; 1] ! R by
For example, (t) = 2t when h t = W t . Some algebra shows that
Therefore, if fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is a controllable small uncertainty, (31) becomes
for all w. When fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is a quadratic small uncertainty, approximation (38) becomes
which reduces to (33) when h t = W t . We now study the order e¤ects of risk and model uncertainty attitudes by extending Limit Cases 1-4 to the present general binomial setting.
Proposition 48 Let fh t ; t g t2(0;1] be a controllable small uncertainty, where t sq =) . Then (t) = O kh t k qt and
Notice that we already observed that ( q #) and # q 2 are never negative and we characterized their positivity in Proposition 43. Condition (t) = O kh t k qt shows that …rst order e¤ects never arise at a controllable small uncertainty. Thus, only second order and negligible e¤ects are relevant . We study them through the analysis of Limit Cases 1-4, as the next result shows. Since it fully characterizes the binomial case, often used in mathematical …nance, it can be viewed as the paper main result. In Limit Case 1 both risk and model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fh t ; t g t2(0;1] . This case is characterized by a with nonsingleton support di¤erent from f0; 1g.
In Limit Case 2 approximation (39) becomes
where risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fh t ; t g t2(0;1] , while model uncertainty attitudes have a negligible e¤ect. In Limit Case 3 approximation (39) becomes
where model uncertainty attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fh t ; t g t2(0;1] , while risk attitudes have a negligible e¤ect. Finally, in Limit Case 4 approximation (39) trivially becomes
Here, neither u nor v play any role in the approximation since both model uncertainty and risk attitudes have a negligible e¤ect at fh t ; t g t2(0;1] .
Example 50 (i) If ' k with k 6 = 0; 1, then (t) kh t k qt . In this case the properties of determine which one, among Limit Cases 1-4, arises.
(ii) If ' , then (t) = o kh t k qt and so Limit Case 4 arises. N
A special case
Our analysis so far shows that both risk and model uncertainty attitudes are relevant to describe the limit behavior of C t (w + W t ) and t (w + W t ) as t # 0, unless t quadratically converges to a Dirac probability measure p or has support f0; 1g. In particular, the attitude toward model uncertainty is relevant in the second order approximation unless t sq =) p , that is, unless the decision maker's priors concentrate on a single model p, so that model uncertainty eventually vanishes in terms of quadratic convergence. This is a natural feature of the KMM model that Theorem 49 establishes in full generality for the binomial case.
Intuitively, an instance when model uncertainty eventually vanishes is when the support of the probability t becomes more and more concentrated. The next result shows that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 51 Suppose that the collection of convex hulls fco (supp t )g t>0 has the …nite intersection property.
14 If diam (supp t ) ! 0 as t # 0, then \ t co (supp t ) contains one point p 2 [0; 1] and t w =) p . 1 4 That is, it holds \ t2T co (supp t) 6 = ; given any …nite index set T . For example, this property trivially holds if co (supp t) co (supp t 0 ) when t < t 0 .
Along with Proposition 48, this implies that if p 2 (0; 1) and h t is such that lim t#0 ' (t) = lim t#0 (t) = 0, then
While, if p = 0 and h t is such that lim t#0 (t) = 0 and ' (t) = O ( (t)) as t # 0, then
A similar result holds when p = 1. Hence, under the "shrinking" hypotheses of Proposition 51, only attitudes toward risk may have a second order e¤ect at fh t ; t g t2(0;1] . That is, only Limit Cases 2 and 4 apply. As we emphasized, this is not surprising given that model uncertainty itself vanishes because t w =) p . When p = 0 (or p = 1) risk vanishes too; as (44) shows, in this case both risk and model uncertainty attitudes are negligible.
We now provide some examples to show how the properties of the KMM model established in Theorems 4 and 5 of Skiadas [12] may represent a special case of (43) and (44). As a consequence, [12] ' …ndings that attitudes toward model uncertainty become irrelevant as t goes to 0 may be attributed to the fact that, in the special case it considers for its purposes, model uncertainty itself vanishes
Example 52 Given a scalar 2 R, let
Then, 1 q t = 2 1 (1 t) and
Consider a …nite collection of scalars 1 < ::: < 0 < ::: < K . By (46), eventually q
Let t be a discrete probability measure on [0; 1] with supp t = q k t K k=1
. 15 Since
we have diam (supp t ) ! 0 as t # 0. Moreover, co (supp t 0 ) co (supp ) for each t 0 < t. By Proposition 51, t w =) 1=2 so that model uncertainty vanishes and approximation (43) applies. For instance, consider the uncertain monetary net fh t ; t g t2(0;1] , where h t = W t + O t 2 as in [12, Theorem 4] . It is straightforward to verify that this is a controllable quadratic small uncertainty. Hence, (43) takes the form
Only risk attitudes have a second order e¤ect at fh t ; t g t2(0 ;1] . N Example 53 Given a scalar 2 R and a function o t 2 , let
Then, 1 q t = 1 (1 + ) t 2 + o t 2 and eventually q t 2 (0; 1) if > 1. Consider a …nite collection of scalars 1 < 1 < ::: < K . Then, de…ne through (47) a …nite collection of probabilities q k t K k=1
.
Let t be a discrete probability measure on 
This net is a quadratic small uncertainty since kh t k
It is not, however, controllable since h t (1) does not converge to zero. Hence, we do not know whether it admits the quadratic approximation (38). However, if it did, then it would hold
, and 2 (t) = 1 + O t 2 . Risk attitudes only would have a second order e¤ect at fh t ; t g t2(0 ;1] . N
A Proofs and related Analysis
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose ' 2 O ( ), then there are ; M > 0 such that
Let 2 o ('). For all " > 0 there exists 0 < < such that
Hence, for all n 2 N (choosing = 1=n and M = n) there exists t n < 1=n such that
Without loss of generality, assume that ft n g is strictly decreasing. Set (t n ) = (t n ) for all n 2 N such that (t n ) 6 = 0, set (t n ) = 1 n ' (t n ) for all n 2 N such that (t n ) = 0, and set (t) = 0 otherwise. Let " > 0 and choose N so that 1=N < ". Set = t N . Now for t < consider the two following cases: t = t n for some n 2 N, then t < t N implies n > N , and hence j (t)j
t 6 = t n for all n 2 N, then j (t)j = 0 " j' (t)j.
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In conclusion, 2 o ('). But, letting M = 1=2,
Thus 2 o (') and = 2 o ( ).
Proof of Lemma 4 We prove the "if" part, the converse being trivial. Given ' 2 C ([0; 1]), let " > 0. By the Weierstrass Approximation Theorem, there is some polynomial ' " on [0; 1] with k' ' " k 1 ". By hypothesis, there is " such that R
This implies lim R
Proof of Proposition 12. We refer to the proof of the more general Proposition 28.
Proof of Proposition 13
Consider a small risk fh t ; qg t2
and so for every " > 0 there is t " such that
that is
and hence
, there is t 00 " 2 (0; t " ] such that
The proof is concluded dividing both sides by E q (h t ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 14
Hence,
and so 2 q (h t ) = o kh t k 2 q if and only if k = 1.
Proof of Proposition 15
We only prove point (ii). Set supp q = f! 1 ; :::; ! s g.
If s = 2, set x t = h t (! 1 ) and y t = h t (! 2 ) and q (! 1 ) = q. Recall that x t = O (y t ), that is, there exist ; M > 0 such that jx t j M jy t j for t < . The assumption kh t k q 6 = 0 for all t, implies that jy t j > 0 for all t < . As t # 0, (19) amounts to 
:::; s. Write k i rather than k i1 and notice that k i 2 Rn f0g for all i = 1; :::; s. Then,
Therefore E q k 2 = (E q (k)) 2 and k is constant. The observation that k 1 = 1 concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 17. Let us prove the "only if", the converse being trivial. Let h 2 R n . Since
t 2 ! 0 and so 2 q (h) = 0. Since this holds for any h 2 R n , there is some ! 2 such that q = ! .
Proof of Proposition 20
For convenience we add two points that will turn out to be equivalent to (i)-(iv):
Clearly, (i) implies (ii) and (iii) implies (i).
Next we show that (ii) implies (v). Let n 2 N be such that E q (jh t j n ) = O (t n ), there exist M; > 0 such that E q (jh t j n ) M t n for all t 2 (0; ). Then,
By (v), there exists a norm jk kj 0 on L (q) and M; > 0 such that
Since is …nite, all norms on L (q) are equivalent. Therefore for every norm jk kj on L (q), there is c > 0 such that jk kj c jk kj 0 . Finally, 
Proof of Lemma 23 Since
where e ! is the !-th vector of the canonical base of R (hence he ! ; i : ! R is the projection on the !-th component q 7 ! q (!)).
The usual variance-covariance decomposition delivers
for all !; ! 0 2 . Moreover notice that ! = 2 supp q is equivalent to R he ! ; i d = q (!) = 0, which in turn amounts to he ! ; i = 0 -almost everywhere. In particular (!;
because all norms on L (q) are equivalent. Since kh t k qt ! 0, then 2 (E (h t )) = o kh t k q . This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 25
Set u (h; ) = E 2 (h) and v (h; ) = 2 (E (h)). We prove the "only if", the converses being trivial.
(ii) Let h 2 R n n f0g. Notice that,
2 (E (th))
Therefore,
q (h) for all q 2 supp , 16 and this is true for all h 2 R . This implies that each q 2 supp is a Dirac measure.
(i) Similarly, for all h 2 R n n f0g,
and 2 (E (h)) = 0 for all h 2 R n . Therefore, for each ! 2 , setting h = e ! it follows that
Then q (!) = q (!) -a.e.. In particular, q (!) = q (!) for all q 2 supp , 17 and this is true for all ! 2 . That is, supp = f qg.
(iii) Follows from (i) and (ii). 
Proof of Lemma 27 By de…nition
! = 2 \ t2(0;1] [ t supp q () ! 2 0 @ \ t2(0;1] [ t supp q 1 A c () ! 2 [
Proof of Proposition 28
We already observed that (i) implies (ii), which implies (iii), which implies (iv).
(iv) implies (v). Assume per contra that there exists ! 2 supp q such that there is a sequence ft n g, with t n # 0, such that h tn (!) does not converge to 0. Then, for some " > 0, jh tn (!)j > " for in…nitely many n. Passing to a subsequence, we can assume jh tn (!)j > " for all n. Setting = min f"=2; q (!) =2g, we have q (!) ; "; jh tn (!)j > for all n. Since lim n!1 q tn (!) = q (!), for n large enough it holds q tn (!) q (!)
. For all such n,
which contradicts (iv). Notice that, for the chain of implications (i) ) (ii) ) (iii) ) (iv) ) (v), we did not use the assumption lim sup t#0 jh t (!)j < 1 for all ! 2 q , which will be crucial in showing that (v) implies (i). Let n 1.
n is eventually bounded so that lim t#0 jh t (!)j n q t (!) = 0. If ! = 2 S, by Lemma 27 there is t ! 2 (0; 1] such that q t (!) = 0 for all t t ! . Hence, lim t#0 jh t (!)j n q t (!) = 0. Summing up:
as desired. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 33
See the more general proof of Theorem 40.
Proof of Proposition 34 Let fh t ; q t g t2(0;1] be a controllable small risk that is asymptotically constant. Since eventually supp q supp q t S, then choosing ! 0 2 supp q, X !2supp qt
Proof of Proposition 36 To see that (i) implies (ii) it is enough to observe that there is a > 0 such that, for each t small enough,
(ii) implies (i). For, there are a; b > 0 such that, for t small enough,
Hence, E qt h
Proof of Theorem 40 Since fh t ; t g t2(0;1] is a small uncertainty, then lim t#0 E qt h 2 t = 0. By controllability, eventually max !2supp qt jh t (!)j M p E qt (h 2 t ) for some M > 0. Then max !2supp qt jh t (!)j ! 0. As observed immediately after the proof of Corollary 59, this implies 
Finally, t w =) p .
B Taylor
B.1 Preliminaries Let = f1; 2; :::; N g be a …nite state space = ( ) the probability simplex. If is a Borel probability measure on ,
is called barycenter of . Let I R be a nonsingleton interval and consider two functions functions u : I ! R and v : I ! R that are continuous on I and thrice continuously di¤erentiable on its interior, with u 0 ; v 0 > 0. Set
Notice that for each
5 2 u (I) (and u (I) is an interval since u is continuous), and
; qi is a¢ ne, hence it is continuous, bounded, and measurable, with range in u (I). Therefore,
is continuous, bounded, and measurable too, with range in v (I). Hence,
[at; bt], then jp 00 p 0 j bt at for all t 2 (0; 1]. Passing to the limit delivers jp 00 p 0 j = 0.
is well de…ned, and so is
The next two lemmas on derivatives will play a key role in the derivation of the Taylor approximation.
Lemma 56 Let O be an open subset of a …nite dimensional euclidean space, (S; ) be a measurable space, and f : O S ! R be a function with the following properties:
(c) the functions f and @ f are bounded (hence uniformly bounded by M ) on O S for every multi-index such that j j k.
Then, for each probability measure P on :
(i) the function de…ned on O by
is k-times continuously di¤ erentiable;
(ii) the functions s 7 ! @ f (x; s) are -measurable for all x 2 O, with
for all x 2 O and such that j j k.
Moreover, as y ranges in O, Q ranges in the set of all probability measures on , ranges in the set of all multi-indexes of length not greater than k, sup y;Q; j@ F Q (y)j M .
Before entering the proof's details notice that 
Proof. Notice that, for all x 2 ( "; ") = O, w1 + x 2 (w "; w + ") I : De…ne
next we show that g satis…es assumptions (a), (b), (c) of Lemma 56 for 3-times continuously di¤er-entiable functions.
(a) For each x 2 O, q 7 ! g (x; q) is continuous, bounded, and measurable.
(b) For each q 2 , x 7 ! g (x; q) is thrice continuously di¤erentiable on O. In fact, given q 2 , for all x 2 O and all j; k; l 2 f1; 2; :::; N g
and the functions de…ned by the above equations (for …xed q and j; k; l) are continuous on O.
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(c) The functions g, @ j g, @ kj g, and @ lkj g are bounded on O for all j; k; l 2 f1; 2; :::; N g; in fact, given j; k; l 2 f1; 2; :::; N g, for all (x; q) 2 O (choosing M like in Lemma 57)
next we show that f satis…es assumptions (a), (b), (c) of Lemma 56 for 3-times continuously di¤er-entiable functions.
(b) For each q 2 , x 7 ! g (x; q) is thrice continuously di¤erentiable on O; in fact, given q 2 , for all x 2 O and all j; k; l 2 f1; 2; :::; N g
(c) The functions g, @ j ( g), @ kj ( g), and @ lkj ( g) are bounded by 5M 4 on O for all j; k; l 2 f1; 2; :::; N g; in fact, given j; k; l 2 f1; 2; :::; N g, for all (x; q) 2 O (choosing M like in Lemma 57 and observing g (x; q) 2 (u (w ") ; u (w + ")))
q) @ j g (x; q)j + j 0 (g (x; q)) @ lkj g (x; q)j + j 00 (g (x; q))j [j@ j g (x; q) @ lk g (x; q)j + j@ k g (x; q) @ lj g (x; q)j + j@ l g (x; q) @ kj g (x; q)j]
Then (by Lemma 56), for each Borel probability measure on the function de…ned on O by
is thrice continuously di¤erentiable; the functions q 7 ! @ f (x; q) are measurable for all x 2 O, with
for all x 2 O and such that j j 3; sup x2O; 2 ( ;B);j j 3 j@ F (x)j 5M 4 . Finally, for all x 2 O and all q 2 , g (x; q) 2 (u (x ") ; u (x + ")) implies f (x; q) = (g (x; q)) 2 v u 1 ((u (w ") ; u (w + "))) = (v (w ") ; v (w + ")) and F (x) 2 (v (w ") ; v (w + ")).
19 Thus c (x) = F (x) 2 (w "; w + ") 8x 2 O is well de…ned and thrice continuously di¤erentiable on O = ( "; ") N . Next we explicitly compute its derivatives, using repeatedly the relations obtained above as well as those provided by Lemma 57. As we did for F we just write c rather than c .
For all x 2 O and all j; k; l 2 f1; 2; :::; N g
in particular jc (x)j = j (F (x))j M 205M it only remains to explicitly evaluate c (0), rc (0) x, and x | r 2 c (0) x. 
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B.3 Other Approximations
For all x 2 R such that w + x 2 I and each Borel probability measure on , set R 2 (x; ) = C (w + x; ) w + E (x) 1 2 u (w) 2 (x) 1 2 ( v (w) u (w)) 2 (hx; i) : Equation (55) in the proof of Theorem 58 shows that if x 2 ( "; "), then jR 2 (x; )j 125M 13 + 75M 9 + 5M
Corollary 59 For each Borel probability measure on , and each x 2 R such that w + x 2 I and max !2supp jx ! j < ", then
where m = min f ! : ! 2 supp g, and
The proof builds on the following fact.
Proposition 60 Let y; z 2 R , then 1. y j supp = z j supp , y = z -a.e. on ;
2. y j supp = z j supp ) E (y) = E (z) and 2 (y) = 2 (z);
3. y j supp = z j supp ) hy; i = hz; i -a.e. on ;
4. y j supp = z j supp ) 2 (hy; i) = 2 (hz; i) and, provided w+x 2 I for x = y; z, C (w + y; ) = C (w + z; ).
Proof. 1. and 2. are trivial.
3. For each ! 2 , ! = 0 is equivalent to R he ! ; qi d (q) = 0, which in turn is equivalent to he ! ; i = 0 -a.e. on . where the second implication, again follows from 3.
Proof of Corollary 59. The vector x = x supp 0 (which coincides with x on supp and with 0 on n supp ) belongs to ( "; ") , and obviously x and x coincide on supp . Thus Proposition 60 and (56) deliver jR 2 (x; )j = C (w + x; )
w + E (x) 1 2 u (w) 2 (x) 1 2 ( v (w) u (w)) 2 (hx; i)
In particular, setting m = min f ! : ! 2 supp g,
jx ! j jsupp j which is (58).
As wanted.
Now assume there is a net (x t ; t ) t>0 such that eventually w + x t 2 I and kx t k 1; t ! 0 as t # 0, then eventually max !2supp jx ! j < ", by (58), jR 2 (x t ; t )j L j j 3=2 kx t k is bounded away from 0.
Corollary 61 Assume the net (x t ; t ) t>0 is such that eventually w + x t 2 I , kx t k 2; t ! 0 and kx t k 1; t = O kx t k 2; t as t # 0, then R 2 (x t ; t ) = O kx t k
The simple proof is omitted.
